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Abstract
This article examines the significance of reflexive self-critical modernity in the devel-
opment of early “New Confucianism” by reconsidering the example of Zhang Junmai 
in the context of the May Fourth and New Culture Movements. Whereas these intel-
lectuals advocated scientific rationality and complete Westernization, Zhang’s education 
and research in Germany before and after the First World War led him to a critical 
perspective on Western modernity informed by its contemporary crisis tendencies and 
Western philosophical and social-political critics. Zhang adopted elements from German 
Idealism, life-philosophy, and social democracy to critique the May Fourth and New Cul-
ture Movements and reconstruct the “rational core” and ethical sensibility of Confucian 
philosophy. Zhang’s “self-critical modernity” oriented toward a moral and social-political 
instead of a scientific and technological vision of Westernization. Zhang’s position was 
condemned by New Culture champions of scientific modernity who construed Zhang’s 
position as reactionary metaphysics beholden to the past without addressing his self-crit-
ical interpretation of modernity that adopted early twentieth century Western critiques 
of the spiritual and capitalist crisis-tendencies of modernity. In response to this complex 
situation, Zhang articulated a phenomenological interpretation of the social-political, 
ethical, and cultural lifeworld, drawing on classic and contemporary Chinese and Western 
sources, which endeavoured to more adequately address the paradoxes of Westernization 
and modernization, and the crisis of Chinese ethical life.
Keywords: Zhang Junmai, modernity, May Fourth Movement, lifeworld, rationality, 
democratic socialist politics
Zgodnja politična filozofija Zhang Junmaija in paradoksi kitajske modernosti
Izvleček
Besedilo proučuje pomen reflektivne samokritične modernosti v razvoju zgodnjega 
»novega konfucianizma«, in sicer na primeru ponovne obravnave Zhang Junmaija v kon-
tekstu gibanja četrtega maja in novih kulturnih gibanj. Medtem ko so se intelektualci 
* Eric S. NELSON, Professor of Humanities at Hong Kong University 
 of Science and Technology.
 Email address: esnels@gmail.com
184 Eric S. Nelson: Zhang Junmai’s Early Political Philosophy and the Paradoxes ...
v gibanjih zavzemali za znanstveno racionalnost in popolno vesternizacijo, je Zhanga 
izobraževanje in raziskovanje v Nemčiji pred prvo svetovno vojno in po njej usmeri-
lo h kritičnemu pogledu na zahodno modernost, ki sta ga oblikovali sočasni kriza in 
zahodna filozofska ter družbenopolitična kritika. Zhang je v kritiko gibanja četrtega 
maja in novih kulturnih gibanj uvedel elemente nemškega idealizma, filozofije življen-
ja in socialne demokracije ter rekonstruiral »racionalno jedro« in etično senzibilnost 
konfucijanske filozofije. Zhangova »samokritična modernost« je usmerjena k moral-
nemu in družbenopolitičnemu pogledu in ne k znanstveni in tehnološki viziji vestern-
izacije. Zagovorniki nove kulture znanstvene modernosti so Zhangovo trditev imeli za 
nazadnjaško metafiziko, ki je zavezana preteklosti, pri čemer niso upoštevali njegove 
samokritične interpretacije modernosti, ki je sprejela zahodno kritiko duhovnih in ka-
pitalističnih kriznih tendenc modernosti z začetka 20. stoletja. Kot odziv na te kompl-
eksne razmere je Zhang oblikoval fenomenološko interpretacijo družbenopolitičnega, 
etičnega in kulturnega življenjskega sveta, ki črpa iz klasičnih in sodobnih kitajskih in 
zahodnih virov in si prizadeva za bolj enakovredno obravnavo paradoksov vesternizacije 
in modernizacije ter krize etičnega življenja na Kitajskem.
Ključne besede: Zhang Junmai, moderna, gibanje četrtega maja, življenjski svet, racional-
nost, socialnodemokratska politika
Introduction: The May Fourth Movement and the Question of 
Modernity1
The historian Yu Ying-shih 余英時 described in his recent memoir (Yu Ying-shih 
huiyi lu 余英時回憶錄) how slowly the idea of a “May Fourth Movement” (wusi 
yundong 五四運動) was disseminated. Yu narrates an anecdote from the diary of 
Hu Shi 胡適, dated July 24, 1922, in which Hu expressed his dismayed surprise 
about how many students, while taking college entrance examinations, had no 
conception of what the May Fourth Movement was and signified (Yu 2018, 25).
A more radical interpretation might contend that the very idea of the May Fourth 
Movement is a retrospective historical construction by, initially, the intellectuals of 
the “New Culture Movement” (xin wenhua yundong 新文化運動) in their totaliz-
ing polemic against traditional culture, and subsequently by a Chinese communism 
that constructed its origins from the sprouts of progressive May Fourth ideas.2 
Despite the identification of the iconoclasm of the May Fourth and New Culture 
1 I would like to thank Shengqing Wu and Tze-ki Hon for their comments on earlier versions of this 
paper.
2 On the “totalistic antitraditionalism” of the May Fourth era, see Lin 1979. On the historical 
connections between the May Fourth Movement and communism, see, for instance, the work on 
Guo Moruo 郭沫若 by Chen 2007.
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Movements with the Communist war against tradition as feudalistic, which culmi-
nated in the Cultural Revolution (wenhua dageming 文化大革命), a theme we will 
return to below, significant differences remain (see Zhang 1952, 47).
The varied reception of the May Fourth Movement, which has been interpreted as 
a model for the Communist and Cultural Revolutions as well as the June 4, 1989 
and more recent democratic protest movements, over the last hundred years dis-
closes how it has been constructed and reconstructed for a variety of intellectual, 
cultural, and social-political purposes.3 An initial problem in considering the idea 
of May Fourth is its belatedness and reinterpretation according to the imperatives 
and needs of a plurality of different competing discourses. Edmund S. K. Fung 
introduced distinctions between traditionalism and modern conservativism in 
Republican China, further distinguishing between cultural and political forms of 
conservativism (Fung 2009, 777–813; see also Fung 2010). Yet if the multiplicity 
of overlapping distinctive trends and tendencies are to be adequately differentiat-
ed, the narrative of Westernizing progressive versus conservatives and tradition-
alists is in need of a more fundamental complication and revision (cf. Fang 2019, 
106). This first nexus of issues concerns the belatedness, constructed formation, 
and multiple purposes of “May Fourth”. A second concerns the dangers of “Whig 
History” and the reductive levelling of progressive interpretations.
Wang Fan-sen 王汎森 argued in a recent article that the May Fourth Movement 
signifies a mixed period (or “confused period”) that should be interpreted as a 
network or sematic field rather than as a transition in a linear progression (Wang 
2019, 18–31). We can draw from his discussion how this field of forces concen-
trated around questions of: (1) Enlightenment and revolution; (2) freedom, equal-
ity, and lifeview; and (3) colonialism and capitalism.
The identification of the May Fourth Movement with Western ideas of progress 
and modernization, and its critics with traditionalism and conservatism, is a prom-
inent feature of both initial proponents and subsequent accounts. Modernity, pro-
gress, and Westernization are deeply value-laden and not neutral, objective or 
scientific expressions. They presuppose the narrative of a necessary progress that 
relies on problematic teleological (and thus metaphysical) presuppositions about 
the goal-oriented nature of history and the perfectibility of the human species.
As critical social theorists from Adorno and Horkheimer to Foucault have re-
vealed, naïve progressive histories face the danger of constructing a “Whig histo-
ry” in which this movement is interpreted as inevitably progressing towards the 
3 For extensive discussions of the problems of interpreting the significance of May Fourth, see Chow, 
Hon, Ip, and Price 2008.
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achievement of a specific conception of enlightenment and freedom (Horkheimer 
and Adorno 2002).4 The Whig approach to history is not accidental, given the 
reliance on Victorian conceptions of science and scientific progress among prom-
inent New Culture intellectuals—such as Hu Shi and Ding Wenjiang 丁文江—
who appealed to Western advocates of the positivist program of a comprehensive 
scientization of culture such as W. K. Clifford, T. H. Huxley, and Herbert Spencer, 
as well as more recent thinkers such as John Dewey and his instrumentalist rein-
terpretation of the positivist paradigm.5
There are consequently two interconnected forms of reductionism to be ad-
dressed: the reductive account of modernity and Chinese modernity, and the 
positivist reduction of culture to science and life to instrumental rationality and 
technique. Hu could write to an American friend in 1924 and assert in his debate 
over life-philosophy and scientism that: “We are here living over the days of Hux-
ley and W. K. Clifford” (Hu 2007, 225; Egan and Zhou 2009, 176). According to 
Hu, the new culture is a struggle of science against religion, superstition, and—
following its positivist denigration—metaphysics. Science is understood in terms 
of Darwinistic pragmatism, according to which progress signifies the increasing 
instrumental adaptation to and manipulation of the environment. In line with his 
Victorian and pragmatist sources—and unlike Rudolf Carnap and the emerging 
logical positivism of the Vienna Circle that was concerned with the question of 
science’s social value and radically demarcated scientific and non-scientific ques-
tions6—Hu’s pragmatist naturalism could not adequately address the normative 
and interpretive complexity of the social-political and ethical “lifeworld”, which 
would be developed in Zhang’s works, and consequently issues such as the nat-
uralistic misconception of deriving norms from facts and the extent to which a 
“naturalistic” scientific life-attitude and culture concern the question of the value 
of the sciences rather than scientific truth.
The Complexity of Chinese Modernities
The Whig progressive versus conservative narrative is required by its own logic 
to oversimplify and marginalize the cases of intellectuals who diverge from this 
4 A classic account of Whig history is found in Butterfield 1931. On the May Fourth movement and 
the discourse of Enlightenment, see Schwarcz 1986.
5 On Dewey, Hu, and the modernization of China, see Tan 2003; Tan 2012, 23–44; Wang 2007; 
Zhang 2010.
6 On the complexity of Carnap’s relation to life-philosophy, see Nelson 2018b, 321–46; and Nelson 
2013, 151–56.
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reductive narrative and who are simultaneously traditional and modern, “con-
servative” and “progressive” in different respects. Recent historical works have 
demonstrated the traditionalism of modernizers and the modernity of conserva-
tive traditionalists in Republican China.7 Furthermore, as we will consider here, 
there are modernizing intellectuals who offer different conceptions of what it 
means to be modern and of the relation between modernity and the past. There 
is thus a need to consider the multiplicity and conflict of interpretations over 
what it signifies to be “modern” in Western as much as in Chinese contexts and 
discursive formations.
Accordingly, I would like to reconsider an alternative example, or case-study, that 
throws the prominent homogenizing narratives of modernity and Chinese mo-
dernity into question, indicating the potential for a more complex, differentiated, 
and nuanced account of the May Fourth Movement, its consequences, and its 
contemporary significance. 
The philosopher, political activist, and public intellectual Zhang Junmai 張君勱 
(birth name: Zhang Jiasen 張嘉森, 1886–1969), also known as Carsun Chang 
in the Western world, has had two receptions: one as a moral and cultural con-
servative follower of Liang Qichao 梁啟超 defending “oriental civilization”, and 
the other as a tenacious advocate of constitutionalism, democracy, and a socialist 
mixed economy.8 Zhang’s example indicates the problematic status of standard 
narratives of modern Chinese history. He is typically yet inappropriately—given 
his progressive politics and modernistic intercultural appropriation of Chinese 
traditions—categorized in discussions of his Confucianism as a “conservative” or 
“neoconservative” critic and opponent of the May Fourth Movement who en-
gaged in disputes with significant representatives of the New Culture Movement 
such as—in the polemical response against his lecture on “lifeview” (Lebensanscha-
uung; rensheng guan 人生觀) at Tsinghua University (清華大學) on February 14, 
1923—Hu Shi, Ding Wenjiang, Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, and Wu Zhihui 吳稚暉.9 
Drawing on contemporary European life-philosophical and Neo-Kantian sources 
that had established a demarcation between science and lifeview, Zhang articulat-
ed the difference between lifeviews (which presuppose the affective, ethical, and 
cultural dimensions of human life) and scientific discourses that were ignored in 
the positivist and pragmatist enthusiasm of New Culture intellectuals. 
7 There is a new wave of reexamination of the complexity of tradition and modernity in modern 
China, see for instance Wu 2013.
8 For an overview of Zhang’s thought and its relationship with German and intercultural philosophy, 
see chapter two of Nelson 2017.
9 These essays are gathered in two different collections, including one by Zhang (Zhang 1924).
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The construction of Zhang as a conservative anti-May Fourth intellectual could 
only be perceived to be legitimate from a perspective that homogenizes modern 
Chinese intellectual history. Zhang actively advocated a progressive form of pol-
itics, namely, a democratic constitutional socialism, from World War One to his 
lectures on socialism near the end of his life (Shehui zhuyi sixiang yundong gai-
guan 社會主義思想運動概觀), and critiqued the proposals associated with the 
May Fourth and New Culture Movements from a “leftist” socialist perspective 
as well as the so-called “rightist” perspectives of life-philosophy and Confucian 
ethical-political thought (Zhang 2015).10
Assessments emphasizing Zhang’s conservative political sensibility neglect 
his life-long commitment to democratic socialism. Zhang personally met, cor-
responded, and learnt from German social democratic intellectuals and politi-
cians—including key figures such as Eduard Bernstein, Karl Kautsky, and Philipp 
Heinrich Scheidemann—as he described in a 1928 essay on his political impres-
sion of traveling and studying in Europe from 1919 to 1921 (Zhang 1928, 21–24). 
He studied law with the Marxist Karl Korsch (a pioneering figure of “Western 
Marxism”) as well as philosophy with the idealist life-philosopher Rudolf Chris-
toph Eucken in Jena, with whom he co-wrote Das Lebensproblem in China und 
Europa (Zhang 2015, 2; Korsch 2001, 1147; Zhang and Eucken 1922).
In the same period as Zhang engaged in the life and science controversy, in which 
he articulated a position closer to Wilhelm Dilthey than to his teacher Eucken in 
defending the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) and the role of freedom in 
the cultivation of a lifeview (Lebensanschauung), he was an exponent of contem-
porary German social democratic and British labour social-political thought that 
he helped introduce to China in his 1920 essay on the respective merits of Ger-
man social democracy vis-à-vis Soviet communism (Zhongguo zhi qiantu: Deguo 
hu? Eguo hu? 中国之前途: 德国乎? 俄国乎?), and his 1922 report on German 
social democracy (Xin Deguo shehui minzhu zhengxiang ji 新德國社會民主政象
記) (Zhang 1922b). He engaged with British socialist theory in a 1928 essay 
on the prominent left-leaning British labour theorist Harold Laski, published in 
the anti-nationalist and anti-communist alternative socialist magazine The New 
Way (Xinlu 新路) that he co-edited and which was suppressed by the Nationalist 
authorities, and a 1930 translation, under the name Zhang Shilin 張士林, of A 
Grammar of Politics (Zhengzhi dianfa 政治典範) (Zhang 1928b, 35–36; Zhang 
1930b). Laski would be a key figure for democratic socialism in the developing 
world (notably, Jawaharlal Nehru in India) and the China Democratic League 
10 On Zhang’s socialism, see Jeans 1997. On the relation between his conceptions of Confucian ethics 
and politics of freedom, see Guo 2017.
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(Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng中國民主同盟), with his influence seen in members 
such as the ill-fated advocate of individual rights Chu Anping 儲安平, who had 
studied with Laski at the London School of Economics (Wong 1993, 457–90).
In this article, I will examine the relevance of Zhang’s thinking to an intercultural 
phenomenology (in the wider sense of this expression) of the lifeworld, ration-
ality, and democratic socialist politics. Zhang’s social-political writings from the 
1920s to 1940s reveal a noteworthy Chinese and intercultural contribution to a 
phenomenology of cultural and social-political life. He engaged in debates over 
the best route to the socialization of the means of production and society, advo-
cating the role of ethical and democratic steering in socialization in contrast to 
its totalitarian imposition. Zhang offers ways of interculturally contesting and re-
thinking the social philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Jürgen Habermas, as he 
oriented the goals of the realization of socialism and democracy in relation to the 
concrete realities of the Chinese form of historical life, which offers an alternative 
way of conceptualizing the lifeworld to classical phenomenology, and which he 
depicted through a life-philosophical and phenomenological interpretation that 
emphasized its implicit rationality, intercultural openness, and historical trans-
formability.11 Zhang’s commitments to constitutionally guaranteed political and 
social rights and democratic rule and socialization indicate that a more complex 
and multifaceted history of Chinese modernity—in which specifically modern 
radically democratic incarnations of Confucianism are possible—is needed in 
contrast to homogenous narratives that contend that modernity can have only 
one (whether constructed according to liberal or communist preconceptions) he-
gemonic form.
Zhang Junmai in the Wake of May Fourth 1919
Republican China began politically in 1912 with the fall of the Qing Dynasty. Yet 
it is “May Fourth 1919” that signifies the irrevocable cultural and social break-
through of the West and modernity into Chinese life. There are multiple interpre-
tations of the events associated with May Fourth, 1919 and its highly contested 
implications for Chinese modernization. Zhang offers us a multifaceted example 
to reconsider the question of May Fourth and modernity.
11 Zhang was one of the first authors to discuss Husserl in Chinese, but does not appear directly 
influenced by him. Nonetheless, his approaches to issues of rationality, historical life, and crisis 
shares historical sources and affinities with phenomenology as developed in Husserl. For more 
on Zhang and European thought, cf. chapter two of Nelson 2017. On Husserl, Habermas, and 
intercultural philosophy, see chapter six.
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One way of contextualizing the construction of his image as an anti-May Fourth 
conservative is to return to the archives and historical records. Zhang’s initial 
comments are developed in “China and the League of Nations” published on 
Oct 23, 1919 in the Hong Kong based English language newspaper South China 
Morning Post (Zhang 1919). In this short piece balancing the nationalism of the 
student movement and an international legal and ethical order that would pro-
tect the weak (Republican China) from the powerful (Imperial Japan), Zhang 
endorsed the aims and aspirations of the students, maintaining that the Chinese 
people had supported the allied cause and the Wilsonian idea of internationalism 
in World War I and were opposed to the League of Nations due to the unjust set-
tlement that transferred German colonial interests in Shandong to the Japanese. 
Zhang’s 1919 discussion occurs within the context of Chinese modernity, inter-
preted as a formation of tensions and contestations instead of as a homogenous 
unity. They concern building a modern nation-state, as Zhang employed concepts 
of national self-interest and the realization of a just international political order.12
Zhang would remain sympathetic to what he described as the primary signif-
icance of the 1919 student movement in contrast to its later reinterpretations 
and appropriations by the New Culture and Communist movements. It was an 
expression of the needs and aspirations of the Chinese people for autonomy and 
respect. In “Modernization of China and Revival of the Philosophy of the Con-
fucian School”, a 1965 lecture in South Korea, he noted how its hidden meaning 
was how the Chinese youth demanded radical transformations for the sake of 
transforming China into a modern nation state (Zhang 1965, 91).
Zhang’s commitment to two fundamental demands of the historic May Fourth 
Movement, namely, anti-colonial nationalism and the introduction of democracy 
without the tutelage of one political party, remains operative throughout his po-
litical writings and is noticeable in his philosophical works. 
O. Brière S. J. remarked in Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy, 1898–1950 that: “Chang 
Chun-mai was a partisan of state socialism: for him, the nation comes first, and 
socialism itself is subordinate to it. But his idealistic socialism is aligned more 
closely with the Communist party than with the Kuomintang” (Briere, 1956, 31). 
To be more precise, as glimpsed in his 1919 article and as more fully elucidated in 
his 1930s writings advocating a Chinese form of democratic socialism, national-
ism signified both: (1) a pragmatic imperative of realistic international politics to 
preserve and assert national interests, which China had failed to follow to its near 
destruction; and (2) a normative model of collective flourishing to critique actually 
12 On the context of the idea of nation building, see Hon 2015.
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existing conditions and encourage their active transformation through the devel-
opment of constitutional democracy, socialist planning and steering of the econo-
my that drew on Western and Soviet models, and a renewed Confucian ethos that 
drew on and dialogically engaged Western sources without merely passively receiv-
ing and imitating them.13 It is important to consider how “Western modernity” is 
at best a heuristic and more often a myth given the multiplicity of Western mo-
dernities that were re-interpreted, negotiated, and transformed in the “non-West-
ern” (an expression that perpetuates the idea of the asymmetrical separation of the 
“West”) colonial and quasi-colonial (such as Republican China) periphery.
Nationalism, Autonomy, and Self-Power in Zhang’s Reading of 
Fichte and Spinoza
The nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 had in his 1924 lecture “Nationalism 
and Cosmopolitanism”, published in Sanmin zhuyi 三民主義 [The Three Princi-
ples of the People], defended the anti-colonial nationalism of oppressed peoples 
against the false universality of colonial cosmopolitanism (Sun 1996). Zhang’s 
nationalism likewise addressed an oppressed and scattered people. This is evident 
in his writings on the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte published in 
1926 and 1932. In the 1926 article “The Patriotic Philosopher: Fichte” (Aiguo de 
zhexuejia: Feixide愛國的哲學家: 菲希德), the Germany of 1808 is interpreted as 
a failed state (it is a multiplicity of conflicting states) suffering from Napoleonic 
invasion and national crisis (Zhang 1926, 71–77). Zhang begins by drawing par-
allels between the 1808 German and 1926 Chinese situation, interpreting Fichte’s 
Addresses to the German Nation (Reden an die deutsche Nation (1808)) as a call for 
autonomy, on the one hand, and on the other a patriotic popular movement for 
national rebirth (zaisheng 再生, which would become the name of the journal 
titled National Renaissance in English) that could mobilize a semi-colonized, be-
leaguered, and abject nation (cf. Mittler 2018 102–3).
In his 1926 Fichte article, Zhang’s argumentation follows the themes of Fichte’s 
Addresses and deploys the Kantian language of autonomy, concluding that there 
is a need for the radical reform of Chinese life in three areas: (1) education, (2) 
morality, and (3) national spirit (minzu jingshen 民族精神) and patriotism (aiguo 
yuanli愛國原理).
13 Zhang was a leading figure in a number of political parties and movements during the Republican 
era, including the Chinese State Socialist Party (Zhongguo guojia shehui dang 中國國家社會
黨), the Chinese Democratic League (Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng 中國民主同盟), the Chinese 
Democratic Socialist Party (Zhongguo minzhu shehui dang 中國民主社會黨). On Zhang’s socialist 
politics, see Jeans 1997.
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First, education is described in a Kantian language, in particular in Kant’s es-
say “What is Enlightenment?” (1784) as requiring the cultivation of autonomy 
that necessitates a thorough self-examination and self-critique to escape from a 
self-produced and self-imposed tutelage. Although a process of Enlightenment is 
not lacking in Chinese history, and Chinese Enlightenment thought was for him 
one of the sources of the European Enlightenment, the Chinese people lacked 
autonomy. National education is consequently construed as a political education 
in individual freedom that was currently lacking in Chinese historical life.
Secondly, moral-reformation counters an internally produced and self-imposed 
illness and degeneration that has been created by oneself and one’s own motiva-
tions. Moral reform of a crisis-ridden form of life can occur through a reconstruc-
tion of morality and the formation of a “new self ” and a new national spirit in 
which self-respect and self-love can flourish, as well as love for others and a new 
sense of public community.
Finally, third, self-interested and selfish concerns have led the Chinese people into 
colonial slavery and tutelage. New motivations of “national spirit” and “patriotism” 
require overcoming merely personal individual concerns, including the owner-
ship of property, and the development of one’s own power and own character. 
Independence is achieved through a focus on social rather than merely individual 
fulfilment (Zhang 1926, 71–77). 
The concept of the individual and collective development of autonomy and 
“self-power”, gained in engagement with the “activist idealism” of Kant, Fichte, 
and Eucken and reinterpreted in relation to Neo-Confucian thinkers such as 
Wang Yangming 王陽明, are key underlying concerns of Zhang’s interpretation 
and appropriation of modern Western philosophy in the 1920s and 1930s. Zhang 
connected the Kantian notion of autonomy, the defining concept of political lib-
eralism according to John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, during this period with 
the notion of increasing self-generative power, a concept—as Hannah Arendt 
has demonstrated—that has significant roles and an interconnected history in 
republican and fascist political thought (Habermas 1995, 109–31; Arendt 1968). 
This problematic of “self-determination” (Selbstbestimmung) is visible in Fichte’s 
political thought and its reception.14
14 Fichte had sympathized with the republicanism of the French Revolution in his Contribution to 
the Correction of the Public’s Judgments Regarding the French Revolution (Beitrag zur Berichtigung der 
Urteile des Publikums über die französische Revolution (1793)) and, after his disillusionment with 
French imperialism, called in the Addresses for national mobilization against the occupying French 
forces. Fichte’s The Closed Commercial State (Der geschlossene Handelsstaat (1800)) proposed the idea 
of a self-sufficient planned national economy. On the complexity of Fichte’s nationalism, see James 
2015; Kohn 1949, 319–43.
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Zhang was familiar with the contemporary German reception of Fichte in Eu-
cken and Hans Driesch, and appears aware of the contested political dimensions 
and implications of Fichte’s political thought. Zhang’s Jena teacher and collabo-
rator Eucken had utilized—like Husserl in his 1917 Lectures on “Fichte’s Ideal of 
Humanity” (Fichtes Menschheitsideal)—Fichte’s Addresses in The Bearers of German 
Idealism (Die Träger des deutschen Idealismus (1915)) to defend a nationalist vision 
of German spirit during the First World War (Husserl 1987, 267–95; Husserl 
1995, 111–33). Zhang had accompanied the pacifist and liberal neo-vitalist phi-
losopher Hans Driesch during his 1922 stay in China, collaborating with Qu Shi-
ying 瞿世英 on translating lectures that included one centred on Fichte’s Doctrine 
of Scientific Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre (1795)).15 He also noted the reverential, 
religious attitude of German National Socialism toward Fichte’s Addresses in his 
1932 forward to his selected translation (Fichte, 1932).16 The fascist, communist, 
and social democratic receptions of Fichte emphasized in their own ways his ideas 
of practical activism, economic planning, and self-determination that likewise are 
of primary concern in Zhang’s interpretation.17 
The relation of autonomy and power is addressed again in 1932 in relation to Spi-
noza’s political thought. Hu Shi and Zhang Junmai contributed essays to a 1932 
collection on Spinoza, Dem Andenken Spinozas (In Remembrance of Spinoza) that 
included German and Chinese texts, in honour of the three hundredth anniver-
sary of the philosopher’s birth (Hu 1932).18 Both authors were operating within 
the confines and pressures of the censorship of the Nationalist regime. Hu’s essay 
compared Spinoza and Zhuangzi as pantheistic philosophers. Hu avoided directly 
discussing politics, and concluded by interpreting wuwei 無爲 as non-interference 
and keeping to one’s own affairs. Similar to Hu’s contribution, Zhang played with 
Daoist language and images in his essay. Unlike Hu, however, he did not focus on 
quiet withdrawal but on Spinoza’s political philosophy, praising his contributions 
to democratic-republican thought and focusing on the relationship between au-
tonomy and power (potentia). Potentia signifies, Zhang argued, how the myriad 
things (wanwu 萬物) receive power (quanli 權力) and movement (dong 動) from 
a self-generative (ziyin 自因) god (shen 神) and nature (ziran 自然) as expressions 
for one and the same reality.
15 Fichte is discussed in Driesch’s eighth lecture in China and was translated by Zhang and Qu 
(Driesch 1923).
16 Zhang’s translation is of Eucken’s 1921 edition. On Eucken’s activist idealist and nationalist 
reception of Fichte, see Fulda 2010, 107–50.
17 On Fichte, socialism, and Marxism, see Weber 1900; Rockmore 1982.
18 Compare the illuminating discussion of Hu’s and Zhang’s Spinoza essays in Gálik 1975, 29–43.
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Zhang depicted Spinoza as a thinker of how to unify heart-mind and things (he 
xinwu 合心物). There are two philosophical problems that he draws from this 
analysis: (1) how are intuition and the concept (or conceptual reasoning) one in 
intellectual contemplation (jingguan 靜觀)? (2) how are right (quanli 權利) and 
power (quanli 權力) one and the same in Spinoza’s equation of ethics with natural 
desire (conatus) and the ability (potentia) to act out of oneself ?
First, Zhang’s philosophical works increasingly endeavoured to answer the first 
question emerging from his interpretation of modern Western philosophy by re-
trieving Chinese philosophical discourses within an explicitly modern perspec-
tive. Zhang’s conception of modernity, and his underlying phenomenology of the 
lifeworld and its implicit rationality, is explicitly intercultural. A hermeneutical 
retrieval of this dimension of his works thus provides a significant alternative to 
the Eurocentric conceptions of reason and the lifeworld developed by thinkers 
such as Husserl and Habermas.19
Zhang did not externally impose a traditional Confucian paradigm onto the modern 
philosophical discourse, nor did he appeal to the idea of a special form of Chinese or 
“Oriental intuition” that has been critiqued in accounts of “New Confucianism” (xin 
rujia 新儒家) as a self-Orientalizing (or “inverted” Orientalist) reaction to West-
ern modernity.20 Instead, pursuing a strategy akin to Misch and Husserl, Zhang 
elucidated the rationality (which—as in Husserl and Habermas—is more deeply 
rooted than logical rules for thinking) inherent in each form of historical life or life-
world that is made reflective in philosophy.21 Confucian discourses are not merely 
expressions of irrational Oriental intuition. They indicate a model of rationality that 
could encompass the affective, intuitive, and intersubjectively attuned dimensions of 
human life rather than exclude them as merely subjective and irrational.22 Zhang is 
compelled by his interpretation of the Chinese lifeworld, which has its own ration-
ality, to rehabilitate the Neo-Confucian philosophy of the heart-mind that can en-
compass the contradictions of intuition and rationality, subjectivity and objectivity, 
and the mediation of heart and things (the “internal” and “external” world). 
Secondly, Zhang praised Spinoza as the thinker of the modern freedom of the in-
dividual, in which the equivalence of power and right is the basis of the “spiritual 
19 I develop this interpretation of the lifeworld and rationality in Husserl and Habermas and the need 
for its intercultural reinterpretation in chapter six of Nelson 2017.
20 Compare the discussion of “New Confucianism” and “inverse Orientalism” in Ge 2017, 241–85.
21 On Misch and Husserl on lifeworld, breakthrough, and reflection, see chapters five and six of 
Nelson 2017.
22 On the importance of the affects in ethical life and broader conception of the rational in the 
Confucian lineage, see Nelson 2018a, 193–204.
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freedom” that entails the entire range of freedoms of and rights to thought, speech, 
and publication suppressed under the Nationalist regime. Spinoza introduced a 
new conception of the nation in which the individual is not merely subordinat-
ed as a part of the whole. Zhang’s political writings of this period are shaped 
by nationalist concerns in conjunction with liberal, republican, and social dem-
ocratic discourses and their Chinese reception that he helped promote. They are 
concerned, particularly in the period of the Japanese occupation of China, with 
the salvation of the Chinese people through the development of its capacity for 
autonomy and self-power. The former is identified with establishing a liberal con-
stitutional political order guaranteeing fundamental human, political, and social 
rights, and the latter with the expression and cultivation of the Chinese nation in 
response to its abject semi-colonial condition.
How is Zhang’s interpretation of Spinoza’s potentia, with its identification of 
right and power, to be understood? On the one hand, there is the philosophical 
question of power. In this discussion of self-motivating power in Spinoza, Zhang 
appears committed to a generally naturalistic and secular life-view as much as 
Hu Shi, while opposing reductive scientistic naturalism. Both the instrumentalist 
and life-philosophical variations on naturalism are haunted by the problem of 
the “naturalistic fallacy” of deriving the normative (the guiding “ought”) from the 
factual (the “is”).
On the other hand, power is connected to the ideas of national survival and 
self-assertion operative in Zhang’s political discourse of the 1930s on national 
revival in The Academic Foundation for National Revival (Minzu fuxing zhi xueshu 
jichu 民族復興之學術基礎 (1935)) and the 1934 English language essay “Na-
tional Renaissance Historically Considered” in which he utilized the identifica-
tion of right and power in describing the Sino-Japanese conflict and Chinese 
survival. Dikötter has described how Zhang held a multi-ethnic concept of the 
Chinese nation, defined by common cultural connections and interests rather 
than race and blood (Zhang 1935; Zhang 1934, 708–10).23 The destruction of an 
interrelated family of languages and cultures (i.e., a social-historical lifeworld) is 
consequently the destruction of a people. As in the conclusion of his discussion 
of China’s constitutional crisis in 1931, brought about by the Nationalist Party’s 
postponement of democratic reforms, Zhang again described the international 
arena in social Darwinist language as a “struggle for existence” (Daseinskampf) be-
tween peoples.24 As in Sun Yat-sen’s image of heaps of “loose sand” (yipan sansha 
23 Frank Dikötter has examined Zhang’s rejection of racial purity and common blood in Dikötter 
2015, 182.
24 On the Chinese reception and adaptation of Darwinism, see Jones 2011; Shen 2015, 49–60.
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一盤散沙), the Chinese people are depicted as lacking and in desperate need of 
finding the self-confidence and self-respect that arises through an appropriate 
relation to their own history and heritage for the sake of future development—
and without which they will be scattered by the forces of history (Zhang 1934, 
708–10). The construction of a bifurcation and opposition between tradition and 
modernity, maintained by both traditionalists and their New Culture opponents, 
is self-defeating, since Chinese modernization cannot appropriately occur with-
out an authentic, living connection with the Chinese past. As he concluded in a 
German essay on Confucianism published in Richard Wilhelm’s journal Sinica 
in 1930, there is a need for a relationship with one’s own tradition for the sake of 
one’s present and future condition (Zhang 1930a, 226). Zhang recognized in this 
analysis how the constructive relationship with tradition (such as Confucianism 
in China) is a condition of and vehicle for the cultivation of individual autonomy 
and social solidarity. As Husserl and Habermas have maintained, in their own 
ways in relation to consciousness and communicative action, the lifeworld is the 
condition of modernization and reform rather than an impediment to be colo-
nized and eliminated.
The republican idea of popular self-determination offered Zhang in 1934 a pri-
mary motivation for his interpretation of historical life and the lifeworld. Pre-
serving contact with and reviving past forms of Chinese intellectual and cultural 
life would reintegrate the past and the present. Furthermore, at the same time 
as a reconceptualization of Confucianism indicated a way of responding to the 
modern philosophical crisis of reason, a theme Zhang adopted from Eucken and 
shared with the German intellectual tradition of Husserl, his concerns with the 
social-political crises of colonial modernity led to a transition from the Western 
discourse of nationalism, as the people’s self-expression and self-assertion, to a 
vision of a progressive reconstruction of Confucian lifeworlds and their ethical 
and political discourses. This modern intercultural reconstruction would provide 
the motivational context and bases for modern Chinese society in contrast to the 
deficits of the Nationalist and Communist parties that determined China’s sub-
sequent fate.
A Modern Confucian Critique of Chinese Modernity
Hegel remarked that the Enlightenment is unenlightened about itself (Hegel 
1978, §§549–50). From Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit to The Dialectic of En-
lightenment of Horkheimer and Adorno, modernity is interpreted as demand-
ing its own self-critique (that is, a critique encompassing the modern as well as 
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the premodern) in contrast to a dogmatically conceived opposition between the 
old and the new, faith and reason, or tradition and its disruption (Hegel 1978; 
Horkheimer and Adorno 2002).25 An early twentieth-century Chinese example 
of self-critical modernity engaging its dialectic is visible in Zhang’s confrontation 
with notions of Enlightenment, progress, and modernity that contests the di-
chotomies of tradition/modernity and Occident/Orient presupposed by Chinese 
traditionalist and Westernizing discourses (evident in Hu Shi’s positivistic and 
scientistic response to Zhang’s 1923 lecture on science and lifeview) during the 
Republican era (Hu 2007, 225; Egan and Zhou 2009, 176).
As noted above, Zhang endorsed the initial national and democratic goals of the 
May Fourth student movement. He did, however, critique its interpretation and 
appropriation by the New Culture and communist movements that he judged to 
undermine Chinese national self-interest and democracy. It was these modern 
cultural and social-political concerns that led Zhang into conflict with icono-
clastic “modernizing” forces (nationalist, technocratic liberal, and communist) for 
social-political, cultural, and philosophical reasons.
First, one primary criticism concerned totalitarianism and pluralism, the state 
and civil society. Already in the 1920s, Zhang was concerned with the priority 
of the state and the emergence of totalitarianism in China. His 1931 German 
article “The Constitutional Crisis of the Chinese Republic” (Die staatsrechtliche 
Krisis der chinesischen Republik) unfolded a critique of the Chinese constitutional 
crisis introduced by what he portrayed as the increasing totalitarianism of the 
nationalist one party state (Zhang 1931a, 316–55). Zhang identified the theory 
of the one-party state, and its communist and fascist incarnations in Lenin and 
Mussolini, with the rule of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo Guomin-
dang 中國國民黨) (ibid.). The tutelage of the one party state cannot provide an 
appropriate opening to a flourishing multi-party democracy to the extent that it 
undermines its conditions by failing to guarantee fundamental legal and political 
rights (Grundrechte) and disallowing the long-term habits and practices of civil 
society that help make a people capable of democracy (ibid., 354).
In this essay, in contrast to the four types of crisis identified in his 1922 essay 
discussed later in this work, Zhang adopted the notion of “constitutional crisis” 
from the contemporary German crisis discourse of the waning Weimar Republic 
(Zhang 1922a, 117–23). His critical analysis of the one-party state relied on Ger-
man legal theorists who opposed the multi-party democratic state and supported 
National Socialism. He cited, for instance, two texts by Otto Koellreutter and 
25 On the problematic of modernity in Adorno and critical social theory, cf. Nelson 2020.
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three by Carl Schmitt, including in the conclusion concerning the necessity of 
the national state given the struggle for existence between nations (Zhang 1931a, 
338, 244, 355).26 Whereas the idea of national survival justified the anti-dem-
ocratic revolution that overturned the Weimar Republic in the works cited by 
Koellreutter and Schmitt, achieving a democratic constitutional order was a fun-
damental requirement of national survival in Zhang’s argument.
The May Fourth students’ demand for the constitutional institutionalization and 
public practice of democracy was never realized and—in Zhang’s harsh assess-
ment that already began to form in the 1920s and which he judged to be con-
firmed by subsequent events—was betrayed by the Westernizing May Fourth and 
New Culture intellectuals. In a dire judgment of recent Chinese history, Zhang 
contended that the constitutional and democratic deficits of the nationalist poli-
tics of Sun Yat-sen undermined the legal institutionalization and popular public 
practice of democracy. This deferral prepared the way for Nationalist dictator-
ship in 1927. He repeated this negative assessment concerning China’s failure 
to become a democratic constitutional state in his 1952 The Third Force in China 
(Zhang 1952, 53–69). The Chinese lifeworld was being undermined in two ways: 
while the Nationalist Party created a social vacuum that destroyed the social-po-
litical conditions for democratizing China, the New Culture Movement created 
a spiritual vacuum by destroying its cultural and intellectual (spiritual) conditions 
(Zhang 1962a, 411). In contrast to the radical bifurcation and opposition of tra-
dition and modernity, which is posited by homogenizing theories of modernity, 
the realization of modernity requires a more appropriate and flexible relationship 
with traditions. To utilize Habermas’s language of system and lifeworld, there 
should be a non-colonizing relationship between the forces of instrumental ra-
tionalization (promoted by Hu, Ding, and the New Culture Movement) and the 
complex multi-layered historical lifeworld (Habermas 1984).
Zhang is notorious for his stubborn, almost hopeless opposition to the Nationalist 
and Communist deferral of fundamental human rights for the Chinese people 
and his demand for the immediate introduction of democratic rights and insti-
tutions that would encourage the governmental separation of powers, a plurality 
of political parties and forces, and the formation of a flourishing public sphere 
and civil society that was deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition itself and that he 
articulated in relation to the political philosophies of Kant and Hegel.27
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1820) preserved a number of the achievements of En-
lightenment political thought while seeking to moderate its radical implications. 
26 On their roles in the politics of National Socialist Germany, see Caldwell 1994, 399–427.
27 On the complexity of the contemporary Chinese discourse of civil society, see He 1997.
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As Herbert Marcuse explored in his classic work Reason and Revolution, Hegel’s 
social-political implications were highly contested by adherents and critics on the 
right and the left (Marcuse 1960). Hegelian political discourse played multifari-
ous roles in Chinese political discourses of the 1930s, as seen in He Lin 賀麟 and 
the “Zhanguoce School” (戰國策, “Strategies of the Warring States”) (see Wong 
2018, 616–33; also note Guo 2009 45–69). In his early 1930s lectures on Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right, Zhang did not interpret Hegel merely as an apologist of the 
priority of state. Hegel is interpreted as a theorist of (1) the mediation of powers 
in the constitutional state and (2) the mediating spheres of the family and civil so-
ciety (bürgerliche Gesellschaft, gongmin shehui 公民社會). The social function of the 
family and civil society are also key features of the Confucian reformist tradition 
and its critique of existing political realities. Civil society encompassed a plurality 
of forms of association and social-life between the individual and the state. Zhang 
elucidated the key element of modern democratic political philosophy that stands 
in opposition to the totalitarian obliteration of civil society to the state. This point 
is made again in his 1967 Singaporean lectures on democratic socialism, near the 
end of his life, in which he deployed Hegel’s concept of “civil society” to critique 
capitalism, communism, and fascism as the one-sided reification of respectively 
self-interest, society, and the state as the highest end of social-political life (Zhang 
2015, 15–19).
Second, as we noted in his interpretation of Fichte’s Addresses, autonomy must be 
self-motivated rather than externally imposed. Furthermore, Zhang’s phenome-
nology of the lifeworld led him to the conclusion that democratic institutions re-
quire a democratic culture and motivations that Zhang thought could be adopted 
and reconstructed from Chinese traditions.
Zhang prefigures the contemporary idea of intercultural philosophy. He opposed 
both the complete Westernization of Hu and Ding and the reactive self-Orien-
talism of Chinese traditionalists, expressing scepticism of the very idea of the su-
periority of either Eastern or Western civilization in the 1922 essay “The Crisis of 
European Culture and the Tendency of New Culture in China”, in a way that can 
help resituate Husserl’s more limited interpretation of crisis in his writings of the 
1920s and 1930s on crisis and renewal. Echoing Kant’s account of autonomy in 
“What is Enlightenment?”, Zhang rejected both Chinese traditionalism and New 
Culture Westernization in this essay, suggesting that emancipation from false prej-
udices required a critical relation to both Eastern and Western civilization that 
faced both their limitations and crises. Using the discourses of life-philosophy and 
socialism, he diagnosed the crisis of modernity as both a spiritual crisis of reason 
and a social-political crisis of capitalism (Zhang 1922a, 117–23). Zhang succinct-
ly stated his ethos of individuality and the social in his 1923 lecture on lifeviews: 
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intellectual development should be personal; property distribution should be so-
cial (“智識發展，應重個人；財產分配，應均諸社會”) (Zhang 1996, 118).
Zhang repeatedly stated from the 1920s to the 1960s—notably, for instance, in 
the introduction to his most internationally recognized political work The Third 
Force in China—that the New Culture Movement could not prepare the Chinese 
for autonomy and a flourishing and functional democracy. A modernized Con-
fucian ethos was the route to autonomy and democracy in the Chinese context, 
such that a destructive relation with the past would eliminate its very conditions. 
Zhang’s analysis reveals his affinities with Western thinkers of the integrity of 
ethical life (Hegel), historical life (such as Dilthey and Georg Misch), and the 
lifeworld (Husserl and Habermas). He explicitly connected the iconoclasm of the 
May Fourth Movement (or, at least, its appropriated form in the New Culture 
Movement) with communist iconoclasm, contending that the destruction of tra-
dition was preparation for tutelage and totalitarianism (Zhang 1952, 47). Zhang 
accordingly identified in The Third Force in China the literary anti-Confucian rev-
olution as the preliminary preparation for the right-wing totalitarianism of the 
Nationalist Party, which was hindered by its own corruption and incompetence 
in Zhang’s estimation, and the left-wing totalitarianism of the Communist Party 
(Zhongguo Gongchandang 中國共產黨) (ibid.).
Third, Zhang differentiated in his 1965 Seoul lecture the distinct threads that 
were subsequently identified with the idea of the May Fourth Movement. Four 
tendencies in particular that should be distinguished are:
1. Literary and linguistic transformation from classical to vernacular culture.
2. Sexual transformation from sexual restraints and hierarchical gender ine-
quality to free love and gender equality.
3. Democratic transformation from authority to freedom.
4. Scientific transformation from superstition and subjectivity to evidential 
knowledge (Zhang 1965, 91).
Zhang offered two responses to these four forms of transformation. One ar-
gument addresses how modernity and Confucianism are not merely compati-
ble, based on an understanding of the ethos of the lifeworld, but reinforce and 
mutually establish each other. The reconstruction of the progressive aspects of 
Confucianism in his works on its history accentuated figures such as Mengzi 孟
子 and Wang Yangming, which he interpreted as rational and reformist (Zhang 
1957; 1962a; 1962b; 2016). He reinterpreted Confucianism as a guiding ethos 
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and philosophical way of living that can be differentiated and separated from its 
flawed forms of institutionalization and practice. As an ethos of universal benev-
olence and responsiveness to the interests of the people, it is compatible with and 
can guide and extend the cultural and social-political reform of a way of life.
A second argument concerns the need to recognize the potential deficits and limi-
tations of modernization and Westernization if they are not to become destructive 
and undermine their own aims. Zhang took up the argumentation of 1923 again 
in 1965 in Seoul, stressing the plurality and complexity of the modern situation 
and the necessity of a self-critical rather than a dogmatic conception of moderni-
ty. In a pluralistic and multifaceted modernity, the new is critically interconnected 
with the old, freedom with an order that allows it to flourish, and science with 
cultural and ethical concerns. Zhang’s phenomenological and political analyses 
indicate ways of rethinking modernity, rationality, and the lifeworld—beyond the 
Occidentalist oriented paradigms of rationalization in Husserl and Habermas—
in the Chinese context and more broadly.
Conclusion: An Intercultural Discourse of Modernity
Zhang and other Chinese intellectuals did not passively accept European philo-
sophical and socialist discourses as Eurocentric theories of modernization assume. 
In the case of Zhang’s discourse, modernization occurs in opposition to complete 
Westernization. The problematic one-way street model of modernity, globaliza-
tion, and Westernization encompasses advocates (such as Husserl and Habermas) 
and critics (such as Heidegger) of modernity, as I argued in my 2017 book. It 
evades the actuality that modernity has multiple cultural and social-political or-
igins. Modernization is “creolized”, both mediated and fractured, by resistances 
from the subjugated margins rather than being a purely Occidental formation. 
Revisiting Zhang’s works in relation to phenomenology and critical social theo-
ry, represented respectively by Husserl and Habermas in this article, indicates a 
needful intercultural reorientation of both.
The case of Zhang Junmai indicates how a “conservative” “anti-May Fourth” in-
tellectual shared many of its commitments with two conspicuous differences; he 
was more radically committed to constitutional democracy, which dwindled away 
into a weak “third force”, and rejected its totalizing anti-traditionalism and com-
mitment to naïve one-dimensional positivist-pragmatist ideas of modernity and 
Westernization. The crisis of the breakdown of the authority of the classical canon 
and the traditional Confucian paradigm did not entail its end for Zhang, as it did 
for the New Culture Movement. It was rather another transformation, shaped by 
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internal and external ideas and historical forces, in its evolving history that would 
continue to play a significant role in Chinese modernities.28
Zhang’s growing articulation of a modern “New Confucian” (xin rujia 新儒家) 
philosophy, centring on moral autonomy and critically drawing from and rede-
ploying Chinese classical sources, particularly after the Communist victory and 
his subsequent exile to the United States, has roots in and altered his earlier con-
ception of nationalism that was conceived in relation to republican (Spinoza, 
Kant), nationalist (Fichte, Eucken), as well as social democratic (Laski) sources 
and models.29 The traditionalist and conservative interpretation of Confucianism 
led to the suspicion—one shared by contemporary “New Confucian” critics of the 
earlier generation—that Zhang’s approach was more Kantian and indeed West-
ern than genuinely Confucian and Chinese.30 Zhang’s discourse is not purely tra-
ditionalist nor neoconservative in any narrow sense, unless one can speak of an 
intercultural progressive traditionalism. It is also not merely derivative of modern 
or globalized Western discourses that deny the agency and subjectivity of thought 
and practice to those outside the West. It is a highly mediated modern intercul-
tural response to the perils and perplexities of Chinese modernity that it failed to 
overcome.
It is in this context of a critical fused, hybrid, or mixed (that we can retrospective-
ly designate “intercultural” or “creolized”) conception of modernity that Zhang 
should be reinterpreted. This argument includes his rejection of the specious 
either/or of Chinese tradition and complete Westernization, Sinocentrism and 
Eurocentrism—as illustrated above in his 1922 essay “The Crisis of European 
Culture and the Tendency of New Culture in China” (a work that supplements 
and corrects Husserl’s 1936 discourse of crisis in The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy) and 
in his mature conception of a modern intercultural Confucian philosophy (Zhang 
1922a, 117–23; Husserl 1970). Zhang’s alternative phenomenological and so-
cial-political strategies indicate a potential intercultural path that was not taken 
and judged a historical failure in subsequent hegemonic narratives. However, such 
a historical judgment of failure itself presupposes a problematic homogenizing 
teleological of narrative of modernity, including Chinese modernity, and the May 
Fourth and other historically related movements.
28 Compare his argument concerning the modern role of the Confucian classics after their loss of 
authority in Zhang 1931b, 106.
29 On the “New Confucian” movement, see Makeham 2003; Rosker 2016; Van den Stock 2016.
30 Compare the discussion after the Seoul lecture in Zhang 1965, 99. On the new generation’s 
conservative suspicions concerning the liberalism of earlier New Confucianism, cf. Ge 2017, 241–85.
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Habermas, as a contemporary theorist and defender of modernity as rational-
ization, aptly argued in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity that paths not 
taken remain significant keys for interpreting the paths that were taken and for 
formulating alternatives for contemporary questions (Habermas 2004). Given its 
historical finitude and limitations, Zhang’s path is still suggestive for interpret-
ing the historical formation of the idea of the May Fourth Movement and its 
consequences that contests Whig and teleological historical narratives of moder-
nity and involves the recognition of their belatedness, discursive and ideological 
construction, and functional multiplicity in actual discourses in contrast to their 
homogenous, idealized form.
Habermas’s point about paths not taken in The Philosophical Discourse of Moder-
nity can be applied to his own conception of Occidental reason and its history 
that retains its hegemonic role. First, the Chinese “periphery” reveals aspects of 
modernity that are invisible in its Western “centre.” Second, the complex histor-
ical constellation addressed in this article offer hints and clues to disentangling 
the problematic of modernity itself that a contemporary Western thinker such as 
Habermas—relying on a reconstruction of Max Weber’s Occidentalist narrative 
of the history of rationality—continue to construe exclusively in Western terms 
without an adequate conception of “non-Western,” intercultural, “creolized,’ and 
other alternative modernities.31
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